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Both countries and subnational governments commonly engage in competition for mobile 
capital, offering generous incentives to attract investment. Existing economics research has 
suggested that these tax incentives have a limited ability to affect investment patterns and are 
often excessively costly when measured against the amount of investment and jobs created. 
In this paper, we argue instead that the “competition” for capital can be politically beneficial 
to incumbent politicians.  Building off work on electoral pandering, we argue that incentives 
allow politicians to take credit for firms’ investment decisions.  We test the empirical 
implications of this theory using a nationwide internet survey, which employs a randomized 
experiment to test how voters evaluate the performance of incumbent U.S. governors.  Our 
findings illustrate a critical political benefit of offering such incentives.  Politicians can use 
these incentives to take credit for investment flowing into their districts and to minimize the 
political fallout when investors choose to locate elsewhere.   
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The competition between governments for international capital is fierce, with cash-
strapped governments often providing generous tax holidays, abatements, and other forms 
of incentives to reduce the tax burdens of individual firms.  Between 2010 and 2012, there 
have been over 5,000 documented cases of countries, states, provinces, and cities using such 
investment incentives to lure new projects, encourage expansion of sites, or retain 
companies after threats to move—all in the name of creating or saving jobs.  ICAincentives, a 
for-profit incentive tracking company, finds that such financial incentives are far from trivial, 
averaging over 20 percent of capital investment and amounting to over $58,000 per job 
created.2  In fact, their figures understate the total universe of incentives, as many countries 
do not provide the same level of transparency in their incentive programs as the United 
States, Canada, and European Union members do.  As we document in Section 2 of this 
paper, investment incentives are widespread across the developed and developing world and 
are becoming increasingly costly. 
Investment incentives are not new.  The first documented tax incentive package 
dates back to 1160, when Italian local governments bid for a textile production facility.3  In 
the United States, the first recorded incentive occurred with New Jersey’s luring of 
Alexander Hamilton’s manufacturing company in 1791.4  What has changed since these 
incidents is how common this strategy has become for countries, states, provinces, and 
cities. 
                                                
2 ICAincentives.com 2010-2012. 
3 Wells et al. 1999. 
4 Bernstein 1984. 
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 The growing use of incentives is prima facie evidence that the increased mobility of 
capital has enhanced the ability of firms to pit governments against each other.  Yet, as we 
document in the next section, the assumption that markets “demand” these incentives is 
doubtful at best.  It is not at all clear that communities that avoid the use of incentives will 
be punished with less investment and worse economic performance.   
In short, the use of financial incentives is difficult to justify on economic grounds.  
Fiscally strained governments offer lucrative tax treatment to firms, yet numerous studies 
have documented that these incentives have limited impact on the investment decisions of 
businesses or are too generous relative to the ultimate economic benefits.5 As summarized 
by the Tax Foundation: 
States often overpay, granting such generous tax abatements that their already 
resident taxpayers must pitch in more just so that state “economic development” 
officials can make headlines rolling out the red carpet for a newcomer.6 
 
What does the competition for capital mean for a country’s ability to make taxation and 
spending decisions? How does it affect state sovereignty?  Unlike previous international 
political economy research that focuses on the competition across countries in slashing tax 
rates, we focus on the increasing use of special location incentives that allow politicians to 
discriminate in favor of some types of investor over others.  Whether there is a prisoner’s 
dilemma in tax competition or not, we argue that these incentives can actually be used as 
part of a political strategy for politicians seeking reelection.   
                                                
5 See Moran 1998, Head et al. 1999, Morisset and Pirnia 1999, Oman 2000, Blomstrom and 
Kokko 2003, Bobonis and Shatz 2007, and Buettner and Ruf 2007. 
6 Ahern 2010. 
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We hypothesize that, while financial incentives have uncertain economic benefits 
(and can even be economically inefficient), they can help politicians win reelection.  
Specifically, our project examines how voters reward and punish politicians for investment 
and the offering of incentives.  We use a theory of politicians “pandering” to voters—
whereby politicians endorse popular policies that provide short-term political gain at the cost 
of lower economic performance over the long term—to explain the political logic of 
politicians offering incentives.  Thus, even in states that are certain to attract investment or 
certain not to attract investment, politicians are motivated to offer lucrative incentives. 
Our theory does not necessarily contradict work focusing on how competitive 
pressures affect government policy.  Rather, we simply highlight that the electoral calculus 
makes it such that offering incentives is a winning strategy independent of competition from 
other locations. Our project illustrates how politicians can harness policy levers like tax 
incentives to claim credit or avoid blame for economic outcomes.  Far from constraining 
governments, globalization can actually generate more variation in local economic policy 
choices.  
In many countries, both the central government and subnational authorities provide 
incentives.  In the United States, however, states largely control the policy levers necessary to 
attract investment.  Many states have even gone as far as establishing offices in foreign 
countries.  By last count, U.S. states had established 175 foreign offices to promote trade and 
investment.7  Governors of U.S. states, much like the leaders of economically competing 
countries, have become increasingly active in attempting to woo foreign capital by using 
                                                
7 Le et al. 2002, cited in Bobonis and Shatz 2007. 
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financial incentives to distinguish their states from competitors.8  Taking advantage of this 
ability of state politicians to offer special incentives, we use the U.S. as a laboratory to test 
our theory. 
We specifically test this theory using a survey experiment embedded in a nationwide 
Internet survey that explores individuals’ voting intentions for U.S. governors.  This 
experimental approach has the advantage of testing the net effect of tax incentives and 
investment on voting intentions. Because the treatment is exogenously assigned, whether a 
respondent learned their state won a project or offered a tax incentive is designed to be 
orthogonal to the individual attributes of voters, specifically their previously held views 
about fairness and taxation.  This strategy mitigates the concern that the underlying views of 
citizens inform both a governor’s selection of economic policy and voting intentions, leading 
to a spurious correlation between the two latter variables.  Our treatment not only provides 
the respondent with a realistic amount of information on the investment, it also tests the 
impact of incentives and investment on voting behavior, not simply on policy evaluations. In 
other words, we don’t want to know “What do you think?” so much as “What will you do?”  
This, of course, is what a politician running for reelection most cares about. Our main 
finding is that, although attracting new investment benefits incumbent governors, the size of 
the vote bonus is enhanced by the use of incentives and by voter type.   
A governor reaps more reward for new investment in his or her state if his or her 
administration offered tax incentives. In fact, a governor will be rewarded for offering tax 
incentives even if it does not succeed in luring the intended investment. Even more 
strikingly, the use of incentives protects against downside risk.  The vote bonus for offering 
                                                
8 Davis 2004. 
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greater incentives than competitors do is actually higher for a governor whose state loses the 
project (about 5.2 percent from all respondents and 10.7 percent from political 
independents).  Thus, whether or not the policy was effective, the incumbent gets credit (and 
votes) for trying.  Few other policy actions by a governor can play so immediate a role.  The 
long-term investments in infrastructure, education, and regulatory reform that have been 
shown to have the most influence on firms’ location decisions are likely to bear fruit only 
years afterward, perhaps after the governor’s political career is over, and so are difficult to 
identify with him or her. 
The effect of incentives on winning votes varies greatly across governors and sub-
groups of voters. By interacting our treatment with pre-determined attributes of voters and 
the state they are in, we are also able to explore these heterogeneous treatment effects. In 
particular, we learn that party identification matters a great deal.  The use of incentives is 
most effective among registered independents and least effective in attracting Republican 
voters.  More speculatively, when we interact the treatments with previous measures of 
governor approval, we find that incentives bear the greatest fruit for unpopular governors. 
This result indicates that offering incentives may be used as part of a gambling-for-
resurrection strategy, whereby unpopular governors have a higher incentive to engage in an 
economically risky policy. 
Our paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we outline the literature on tax 
competition and how the contest for investment can lead to economically inefficient 
policies.  We point out that much of the scholarship has focused on the economic costs and 
benefits of changing tax rates on capital, but has not explored the political dynamics 
underlying these changes.  In Section 3, we review the recent literature on globalization and 
mass be havior and link this to our study of U.S. governors.  We argue that the United States 
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is an excellent laboratory in which to examine how voters blame or reward politicians for 
economic policy related to globalization.  We conclude Section 3 by theorizing about the 
decisions by incumbent politicians to offer firm-specific incentives greater than those being 
offered by other states.  Unlike other models in public finance, we focus directly on the 
relationship between tax incentives and reelection, while allowing for incentives targeted to 
specific firms.  In Sections 4 and 5, we introduce our research design, explain the data we 
gathered by including survey experiments in the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey 
(CCES), and discuss our empirical results.  Section 6 concludes by assessing the implications 
of our findings for the political economy research agenda.  
Competing for Mobile Capital 
 There is a large literature on the competition for international capital.  Within the 
public finance literature, a number of influential articles model how governments, 
maximizing the utility of the representative household, set taxes in a world of mobile capital.9  
This competition for capital can lead to downward pressure on tax rates and revenues, yet it 
does not require all governments to charge the same tax rate.10  Such competition can 
indirectly result in the under-provision of public goods11 but it can also help constrain 
excessive government.12 
 Political scientists have built upon this public finance literature, explaining corporate 
tax-rate setting under different institutional settings and different partisan compositions of 
                                                
9 Tiebout 1956; Oates 1972; Wilson 1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986. 
10 See Wilson 1999 and Wilson and Wildasin 2004 for a review of this literature.   
11 Wildasin 1989. 
12 Brennan and Buchanan 1980. 
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government.  This includes work identifying that statutory corporate taxes have converged 
across OECD countries, while the effective tax rates and corporate tax receipts have 
remained relatively stable over time.13  Hays and Swank find evidence for tax policy 
competition; yet, this form of tax competition and diffusion is more nuanced than that 
presented in the traditional race-to-the-bottom literature.14  Basinger and Hallerberg find that 
domestic political institutions, operationalized by the number of veto players and the 
partisan composition of government, temper tax competition.15 
We believe that the public finance literature on tax incentives has largely ignored two 
related points.  First, governments can offer tax incentives specific to individual firms.  In an 
influential paper on the provision of tax incentives, Li examines 58 developing countries and 
their use of six different types of firm-specific incentives in 1990.16  These countries, on 
average, used 1.3 types of program; just under a quarter of the countries offered no tax 
incentives at all and only one offered all six types. The 1996 U.S. Commercial Guides provide 
some descriptive evidence on the increasing use of these incentives.  Of the 78 developed 
and developing countries discussed, 80 percent offer at least one type of incentive, with 
many offering more than one (averaging just over 2.5 incentives per country).  The most 
                                                
13 Swank and Steinmo 2002. 
14 Hays 2003 and Swank 2004, 2006. Recent work by Pinto and Pinto 2008 explores how the 
complementariness of foreign capital with domestic labor and domestic capital affect tax 
policy.  
15 Basinger and Hallerberg 2004. 
16 Li 2006. These are (1) incentives related to value added taxes, (2) corporate income taxes, 
(3) property taxes, (4) licensing fees, (5) import duties, and (6) sale taxes. 
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common of these incentives are corporate income tax holidays (69 percent) and exemptions 
from import duties (62 percent). These data clearly document that most countries offer 
incentives and have increased the activity over time. Other scholars document that these 
programs are becoming more costly, although systematically documenting this rise requires 
some care.17 These stylized facts suggest that targeted, firm-specific incentives have become 
the norm in investment promotion, yet they have been largely ignored by the political 
science literature. 
Second, as the political science literature has demonstrated, politicians will use tax 
and other economic policies not necessarily to maximize growth and investment, but to 
maximize the probability of staying in power.18  Indeed, political science has identified two 
benefits of politicians favoring reelection over economic performance for policy outcomes: 
correcting moral hazard and correcting adverse selection problems.19  But the use of 
economic policies to attract votes comes with costs, the most important being the pandering 
problem, whereby politicians choose popular policies that are contrary to voters’ interests.20  
Harrington has shown that voters’ uncertainty about the efficacy of the different policy 
choices and about the incumbent’s future intentions will trigger pandering behavior by the 
                                                
17 See Thomas 2011. 
18 The political science arguments cited above include discussions about how veto players 
and levels of partisanship affect tax policy setting.  Most recently, Plümper et al. 2009 
demonstrate formally that corporate tax rates are constrained by domestic political 
considerations. 
19 Maskin and Tirole 2004. 
20 Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts 2001. 
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incumbent.21 The key insight from the pandering literataure is that even if the incumbent 
begins the reelection campaign with a strategy based on his or her personal beliefs about the 
effectiveness of a particular policy, reelection pressures create a bias towards policies that are 
more popular with voters, even if they are less effective. Thus, politicians with sincere 
concern about the welfare of voters and perfect information about the ineffectiveness of 
incentives, may still choose the “bad” policy due to reelection pressures. 
These observations help us understand a number of puzzles in the literature on tax 
incentives.  Specifically, a growing economics consensus points out that (1) tax incentives are 
ineffective in luring investment to a particular location and (2) the large incentives being 
offered are economically suboptimal for states, sometimes amounting to a net transfer to 
investors.22  
The use of these incentives, despite the well-documented limits and uncertainty of 
their effectiveness, perplexes economists.  One high-profile study is Wells et al.’s 
examination of the how the repeal of tax incentives in Indonesia, even in the face of growing 
regional competition for investment, had no adverse consequences.23   Most recently, 
Bobonis and Shatz explore the agglomeration effects of investment, by which attracting new 
investment has a positive impact on attracting more investment.24  This finding seemingly 
supports the use of tax incentives to prime the pump.  Yet, the authors directly test the 
                                                
21 Harrington 1993. 
22 For an overview, see Oman 2000. 
23 Wells et al.’s 2001. 
24 Bobonis and Shatz 2007. 
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impact of tax policies on investment location and find that incentives have “little influence 
over the location of FDI [foreign direct investment].”25     
Tax incentives, even if they are purported to sway location decisions, often appear 
out of proportion to their direct benefits.26  In an extensive review of the literature, Morisset 
and Pirnia find that tax incentives cannot overcome major obstacles to investment, such as 
poor infrastructure, and the costs often exceed the benefits.27  Blomstrom and Kokko argue 
further that, while scholars have documented the positive spillovers of foreign direct 
investment, government incentive policies to maximize these spillovers are inefficient.28       
Examples of excessive incentives are easy to find.  Moran documents a number of 
high-profile incentives to attract manufacturing investment in the United States.29 Alabama 
successfully attracted a Mercedes-Benz plant, for example, by offering subsidies that 
exceeded $200,000 per employee.  Thomas and Wishaadle show that, since 2002, U.S. states 
have offered 17 incentive packages in excess of $100 million each; the authors argue that 
these incentives are not only expensive but economically inefficient.30  With sky-high 
numbers such as these, it is no surprise that Head et al. concluded that the incentives are 
often larger than the gains.31   
                                                
25 Bobonis and Shatz 2007, 39. 
26 Buettner and Ruf 2007. 
27 Morisset and Pirnia 1999. 
28 Blomstrom and Kokko 2003. 
29 Moran 1998. 
30 Thomas and Wishaadle 2009. 
31 Head et al. 1999. 
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For us, however, the debate between economists and practitioners is merely a 
starting point.  While we note that there is some evidence regarding the ineffectiveness of 
tax incentives, we don’t take a stand on the relative economic benefits of incentives under all 
circumstances. Certainly, readers can think of occasions when incentives have been or may 
be fruitful.  Of greater interest to us is their widespread use despite clear uncertainty about 
their efficacy.   
Something else is at work here, and we argue that it is political pandering. We argue 
that for politicians to pander, voters need not actually hold incorrect views about the 
benefits of incentives; they only need to be unsure enough to be persuaded in a campaign. 
This less stringent assumption means that two politicians can have opposite opinions about 
the actual economic utility of investment incentives, yet both will find such incentives 
helpful for attracting votes in the next election.   
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Globalization and Governors 
In this paper, we examine how attracting investment affects the political fortunes of 
incumbent governors of U.S. states.  Why focus on U.S. states?  Our theory generalizes 
across countries, yet we believe American states are an excellent laboratory for our inquiry.  
Similar to countries, many of the important determinants of investment at the state level, 
such as size of the market, quality of infrastructure, or the level of human capital, are 
difficult to change in the short to medium term.  Moreover, it is difficult for a politician to 
claim that these features are associated with a specific investment within their borders.  
Consequently, offering firm-specific financial incentives to projects has become one of the 
main short-term, economic development strategies of countries and subnational government 
around the world.32 Tax incentives have two obvious benefits for executives at all level of 
government: 1) they can be issued immediately; 2) they are directly linked to an individual 
project.  While the European Union has institutional constraints that limit the amount of 
incentives offered, and Canada and Australia have laws limiting tax competition across 
provinces, many countries and their subunits compete with one another for individual firms 
by using tax incentives.33 Fiscal wars across Brazilian states have led to extremely lucrative 
packages to auto producers, while countries as diverse as Costa Rica, Egypt, Ghana, Israel, 
are known to provide handsome inducements.34  Although it is difficult to compare the size 
                                                
32 Thomas 2011. 
33 See Thomas and Wishlade.  2009 for a discussion of EU laws limiting competition and the 
decrease in the size of investment incentives since 2002. 
34 Thomas 2007. 
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of these incentives across countries35, Eason (2004) argues that incentives in the U.S. and 
across borders have increased dramatically in recent years.   
Focusing on US states allows us to examine the setting of incentives while holding 
constant political institutions, culture, and other difficult to measure factors that can lead to 
unobserved heterogeneity and bias results in a cross-country analysis.  Like many countries, 
US states have a diverse array of automatic incentive programs and the ability to provide 
discretionary incentives to firms.  Some states have “deal closing funds,” while others 
provide incentives through the normal legislative process.  The mixture of discretionary and 
non-discretionary incentives mirrors that observed in countries, and creates variation in the 
tools available to incumbent leaders36 
 We focus on governors rather than members of the House or Senate for two 
reasons.  First, while members of Congress certainly engage in activities to increase 
investment, their efforts predominantly take the form of informal suasion.  They have little 
control over formal state-level policy levers that voters can see and associate with an 
investment project.  Secondly, voters have a limited ability to assign credit when multiple 
politicians operate within the same state.  Large investment projects create revenue, 
employment opportunities, and business spillovers that reach beyond an individual 
congressman’s electoral district and the policies that attract these activities are often the 
results of legislation that requires the support of many legislators. 
By contrast, governors’ activities to attract investment are clearly attributable by 
                                                
35 As Thomas 2011 points out, the details of these incentives are often hard to come by and 
the forms of accounting for the value of these incentives varies across country.   
36 Jensen 2006. 
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voters to a single actor, allowing voters to assign responsibility to the governor for her 
performance.37  Even existing tax incentive programs can be re-tailored to attract or retain 
specific investments.  For example, New Jersey’s Urban Transit Hub Tax Credit was added 
to a previous package “by Governor Corzine in January 2008, largely to stop financial 
services giant, BlackRock Private Equity Partners, from moving more than 1,000 jobs from 
Plainsboro to Pennsylvania.”38  
Third, governors across the country are visibly active in attempting to attract 
investment, traveling abroad on commercial visits and using the powers of their office to 
offset investor start-up costs with tax holidays, property tax reductions, and other incentives.  
Governors are perceived by voters to be the actors most responsible for attracting 
investment and voters can reward them for their performance.   
Finally, 30 U.S. states have “contingency funds” or “deal closing funds,” averaging 
between $7 and $10 million in additional incentives that can be added to existing tax 
incentive packages.  The largest of these funds is the behemoth $250 million Texas 
Enterprise Fund, which provides tax incentives authorized by a three-person board made up 
of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Director of Economic Development.   
Scholars have argued that voters reward governors for economic outcomes that 
reflect their actions and tend not to take into account economic events that reflect influences 
outside the governor’s control.39  Cohen and King make a similar point, arguing that voters 
                                                
37 See Hellwig and Samuels 2008 for a cross-national analysis of how institutions affect the 
attribution of responsibility.  
38 Morley 2011. 
39 Wolfers 2002,1. 
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recognize the limitations of state governments to affect the economy and often focus their 
attention on the governor’s (perceived) ability to generate jobs.40 For Cohen and King 
(2004), the level of unemployment relative to other states has the largest effect on voting.  
More broadly, Arceneaux (2006) finds that in federal systems, such as the United States, 
citizens sanction politicians for policy decisions over which their level of government has 
responsibility.  These studies all identify the importance of state economic conditions for the 
reelection prospects of governors and find that voters are reasonably sophisticated in 
assigning credit and blame to specific politicians.  Combining these insights about attribution 
with the established theories of electoral pandering cited above, we derive three hypotheses 
of how voters will respond when politicians use investment incentives to claim credit or 
deflect blame for the investment projects their states do or do not get. 
Building on the pandering literature, we argue that voters largely reward politicians 
based on economic outcomes and policy. Some work, such as Canes-Wrone, Herron, and 
Shotts (2001) focus on how economic outcomes signal an incumbent’s “type”.   
Alternatively, some of the pandering models argue that voters select politicans based on the 
popularity of a policy position taken (Maskin and Tirole 2004).  In both cases, this can lead 
politicians to select policies that actually are not in the interests of voters.   
In our paper, following Harrington (1993), we argue that voters have an intristic 
interest in economic outcomes (attracing investment) and have beliefs about the 
effectiveness of policy (incentives) in acheving these outomes.  Thus voters observe a policy 
choice (incentives) and the outcome (investment) but they cannot directly observe how 
important the policy choice was in determining the outcome.   Their prior beliefs about the 
                                                
40 Cohen and King 2004. 
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effectiveness of the policy, however, shape how they reward incumbents.  We argue that 
even if such tax policies prove to be economically inefficient, politicians can make use of 
them to signal their own alignment with the voters’ interests.     
Our pandering theory rests on three reasonable assumptions.  First, we must assume 
that voters generally believe that incentives can be an effective way to attract investment.  
This assumption is not controversial and is supported by a 2005 Polimetrix survey that 
found that over 70 percent of U.S. respondents believed tax incentives were a very 
important determinant of firm location choice.41    
 Second, we assume that voters can directly observe the offering of incentives.  This 
assumption is difficult to document systematicaly, but numerous governors’ campaign 
websites and press releases tout the use of incentives to attract firms. Far from hiding these 
incentive programs, governors advertise their use.  
Third, we assume that voters have imperfect information on how pivotal a specific 
incentive was to attracting a firm.  Again, this is not conterversial, since voters cannot 
observe the counterfactual of no incentive, while both governors and firms have reasons to 
lie about the importance of incentives for the firm.  Governors want to claim credit for the 
investment and firms want to minimize their tax burden by maintaining a threat of exit.  In 
short, these are three reasonable assumptions that fit our U.S. case, but are also likely to hold 
in other countries around the world. 
                                                
41 See Polimetrix 2005 for details.  For further analysis of the knowledge of voters regarding 
tax incentives, see Online Appendix 3, in which we document the self-reported knowledge 
of partisan and independent respondents. 
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In other words, governors can claim credit for investment through the use of 
incentives.  If voters believe higher incentives are a good policy choice and are unable to 
evaluate whether or not a particular incentive really was pivotal in attracting a particular firm, 
voters will be systematically more likely to reward politicians for using incentives than to 
punish politicians for overusing them.  This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1 (Credi t - c la iming) :  Voters are more likely to vote for an incumbent governor who attracted 
a firm to the state with incentives than for an incumbent governor who attracted the same firm 
without incentives. 
 
 Taking this logic a step further, pandering allows politicians to escape blame for poor 
economic performance by claiming that they enacted the policies favored by voters and 
made a clear effort to improve the economy, even if the effort was unsuccessful.  Pandering 
logic dictates that voters should be more willing to accept policy choices that did not succeed 
as long as they are in line with the voters’ beliefs about such policies.   
 H2 (Blame-avoidance) :  Voters are more likely to reelect an incumbent governor who failed to 
attract a firm despite offering incentives than an incumbent governor who failed to attract the same 
firm and did not use incentives. 
 
 Both of these hypotheses make the assumption that voters prefer the use of tax 
incentives to attract investment.  Nevertheless, substantial literature on the political economy 
of international trade has focused on how politicians use policies as an “inefficient 
redistribution” from citizens to firms.42  Work by Kono (2006) shows that electoral 
                                                
42 See Acemoglu and Robinson 2001 for a helpful review of these arguments.  Seminal work 
by Magee, Brock and Young 1989 argue that electoral pressure leads to “optimal 
obfuscation” of policies.  See Rodrik 1995 for a review of the policy economy of different 
trade instruments.     
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institutions shape the form of these policies.  Democratically elected politicians hide these 
redistributive policies from voters, by focusing on policy instruments that are too complex 
for voters to understand and for opposition politicians to use as fodder for political 
campaigns. 
Firm-level incentives are one of the more transparent policies that politicians can use 
to attract firms.  In fact, they have to be for the politician to claim credit.  On the other 
hand, transparency also facilitates the ability of opposition groups to resist the use of public 
money for “corporate welfare” that allocates state funds to companies rather than to 
citizens.  Examples include recent public backlash against state film incentive programs,43 
NGOs that track and criticize incentives such as Texans for Public Justice and Good Jobs First, 
and a recent scathing New York Times series on US investment subsidies.44     
These recent examples illustrate the potential for these incentives to be labeled as 
“corporate welfare” and therefore resented by voters45  Thus, an alternative expectation 
stresses public scrutiny of the use of government funds for economic development and a 
preference for lower rather than higher use of incentives.     
 
                                                
43 The most high-profile case was a series of scandals involving Iowa’s film tax credits.  For 
an outsider auditor’s report on fraud, see 
www.iowalifechanging.com/downloads/filmreport09.pdf. 
44 Story 2012.  
45 See Bartlett and Steele 1998 for an earlier expose on investment subsidies. See also 
Whitfield 2001, Dawkins 2002 for work on corporate welfare and Thomas 1997 for work on 
public campaigns against corporate welfare. 
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H3 (Cost-bene f i t  analys is ) :  Voters are more likely to punish a governor who offers investment 
incentives that are greater than those offered by competing states. 
 
We believe these hypotheses are generalizable outside the U.S., where models of 
economic voting at the country level share commonalities with those across subnational 
locations.   Yet theoretical work has not yet fully explored the relationship between the 
policies of elected officials and citizens’ voting intentions. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
Our empirical analysis builds on the observational studies on incentives, yet our 
research design is intended to correct for biases in previous work. First, given the increasing 
trend of offering tax incentives to attract investment, it is difficult to harness observational 
analyses.  Theoretical and empirical issues, such as endogeneity, complicate statistical 
identification.  Specifically germane is the issue of unobserved heterogeneity among 
governors.  Particularly entrepreneurial governors may be the most popular in general and 
also the most likely to offer investment incentives, leading to a correlation without a direct 
causal relationship.   
Second, we directly examine if these policies are relevant for voters.  This cannot be 
taken for granted; for example, in a recent study of trade, Guisinger (2009) finds that voters 
have little knowledge of individual trade policies and that trade has very little impact on vote 
choice.  We address this question by focusing directly on how the offer of tax incentives 
affects the voting intentions of individual voters.   
Limitations of causal inference can be mitigated through an experimental approach.  
Specifically, we use a survey experiment to randomize treatment across individuals.  This 
allows us to test the causal mechanism linking policy to the perceptions of individual voters.  
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Rather than focusing on satisfaction with the governor, we ask respondents how a policy 
(tax incentives) changes the probability of their voting for the incumbent.  Consequently, we 
can isolate the differential effects of incentives from the effects of the underlying flow of 
investment.  This is an especially rigorous test of our hypotheses. 
Our analysis uses a survey experiment placed in the Cooperative Congressional 
Election Survey (CCES), a nationally representative Internet-based survey of 13,800 
Americans administered by YouGovPolimetrix in October 2009.  Respondents were asked 
demographic questions, queries on voting and partisanship, and tests of their knowledge of 
how their elected officials had voted on specific legislation.  We added our questions to a 
nationwide subsample of 1,974 respondents.   
Our main question was a survey experiment testing how the respondent’s intention 
to vote for the incumbent governor was affected by the governor’s use of tax incentives to 
attract (or at least try to attract) an investment project.  The only information we provided 
on the project was the number of jobs created, so that the respondent recognized the event 
as influential on the state’s economy.  Small investment projects would likely not be 
considered important enough to alter voting behavior.   We offered no other information on 
the investment—in particular, no negative information—because our ultimate research 
question is whether tax incentives help politicians claim credit for positive economic 
outcomes.  It was critical for our design that the relatively positive depiction of the 
investment (the number of jobs) had no impact on the voter’s ability to separate his or her 
approval of the investment from his or her approval of the incentive policy (also randomly 
assigned), which is the ultimate goal of our research design.  In other words, we allow for the 
response: “I’m glad jobs were created, but I still don’t want to reward the governor for 
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offering tax incentives.” Thus, our survey experiment is a realistic test of how politicians 
claim credit for economic performance.  
Following our theoretical framework, our experiment positions incentives relative to 
the competition, rather than in isolation.  As we noted above, most states offer some form 
of tax incentive, so what really matters for both firms and voters is the relative difference 
between a given state and its competitors for a specific project.46   
The survey experiment divides the sample into four groups with each respondent 
having a 25-percent probability of receiving one of four treatments.  These treatments 
consisted of two dimensions, investment attraction and tax incentives.  Our question reads 
as follows, with the two treatments in parentheses: 
Your state competed with a number of other states over a new manufacturing plant 
that will create 1,000 jobs. 
 
With the support of the governor, your state offered a tax incentive 
(break/reduction) package that was [greater/equal or less] than that of the other 
states.  If your state [receives/does not receive] this investment, how would this effect 
your evaluation of your governor’s performance in office? 
 
1)  I would be much more likely to vote for the governor in the next election. 
2)  I would be slightly more likely to vote for the governor in the next election. 
3)  My vote choice would not be altered.  
4)  I would be slightly less likely to vote for the governor in the next election.   
5)  I would be much less likely to vote for the governor in the next election.      
 
All survey experiments force researchers to make difficult choices about question 
wording.  We felt obligated to use a non-conventional, hypothetical construction—“how 
would this…?”—because investment projects of the scale we reference in our survey are 
                                                
46 We would have liked to separate the size of the incentives into three groups (greater than, 
equal to, or less than competitor), but statistical power considerations required combining 
the latter two groups. 
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sufficiently rare and well-documented that a reasonably knowledgeable respondent would 
know whether or not there really had been such a large investment in his or her state.  We 
did not want these respondents to feel that they were being overtly misled, so we chose a 
prospective construction that speculated about a future investment.  Public opinion 
researchers have long debated about whether hypothetical questions lead to inaccurate 
responses.47  Yet some scholars—particularly those in the economics literature who use 
anchoring vignettes, experiments, and contingent valuation designs—have shown empirically 
that respondents can give meaningful answers to hypothetical questions if (a) a neutral or 
“don’t know” option is provided for uninformed respondents and (b) the question allows 
the respondent to draw upon relevant previous experiences to place the hypothetical in 
context.48  We made sure to fulfill both of these conditions.  
Our choice of a prospective construction had two downstream effects.  First, the 
answer options needed to be prospective as well, referencing a hypothetical vote choice.  
Secondly, the prospective construction made it difficult to devise a realistic control group as 
recommended by Gaines et al., because respondents could not be asked to evaluate how 
their vote would change if there was no investment for which to compete and their governor 
took no actions.49  
For this design, the natural baseline is the state that offered less tax incentives and 
did not receive the project.  From that cell, which receives a zero on both dichotomous 
options (0,0), we can calculate the impact of winning the project with incentives less than or 
                                                
47 Converse 1964, 1974; Cummings et al. 1995. 
48 Mitchell and Carson 1989, 173. 
49 Gaines et al. 2007. 
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equal to those of the competitors (Group 2 (1,0)), offering an incentive that is greater than 
those of the competitors but nevertheless losing the project (Group 3 (0,1)), and offering an 
incentive that is greater than those of the competitors and winning the project (Group 4 
(1,1).  In short, all marginal effects calculated in the empirical analysis are derived from 
comparing shifts in incentives and investment to the baseline category (0,0).   
A final consideration was whether to use vote choice in the option or to use the 
standard job approval scale.  We opted for vote choice because we wanted to simulate, as 
closely as possible, the political logic of our theory.  Moreover, we were concerned that using 
approval ratings would overstate the impact of the investment, which might play only a small 
role in voters’ ultimate calculations.50  We also offered a neutral category of “My vote choice 
would not be altered” to provide an opt-out opportunity to respondents for whom 
economic issues are less important than other issues.  Both of these are conservative choices 
that were intended to bias against the pandering hypotheses (H1 and H2).  As a robustness 
check, we included a variable for the respondents’ rating of governor-approval (drawn from 
the common use questions in the Polimetrix survey, which preceded our experiment in the 
sequencing of the survey) in the empirical analysis, to approximate the level of change in a 
respondent’s vote choice.     
Our randomization process worked with only a few very small exceptions; the four 
treatment samples do not differ dramatically from one another across factors (see Online 
Appendix 1).  This indicates that the treatments were uncorrelated with voter characteristics 
and can therefore be assessed directly.  Mutz and Pemantle argue that the display of balance 
tables is not necessary for survey experiments, as randomization can occasionally lead to 
                                                
50 Guisinger 2009. 
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unbalanced covariates on some factors and controlling for these factors can actually bias 
results more than sampling error would.51  In our case, however, the relatively high 
noncompletion rate (about 30 percent) of the Web-based Polimetrix survey creates concerns 
about differential attrition rates in some demographics that could be correlated with the 
treatments.  Fortunately, the balance table demonstrates that this is not a serious concern. 
As a first cut, we provide a comparison of means of these four groups based on 
collapsing our dependent variable from a five-point Likert scale.  We invert this scale with a 
score of 5 representing “much more likely to vote for the governor” and 1 as “much less 
likely.”  As is to be expected, respondents who learned that their state had won the 
investment project were more likely to reward their governor than those who did not.  
Winning the investment increases the likelihood of voting for the governor (checking 4 or 5 
on our scale) by about 20 percent (changing the mean score from 2.85 to 3.37).  This result 
was statistically significant at the 95-percent level of confidence.  More importantly, offering 
an investment incentive has a statistically significant but substantively small impact in 
isolation.  Confirming H1, 2.4 percent more voters say they are likely to vote for the 
governor after hearing an incentive was offered (a change in the mean score from 3.05 to 
3.15), whether or not the state won the project.  
These results are interesting but do not take into account, the conditioning effect of 
incentives, depending on whether the project was won.  To this end, we construct Table 1, 
based on the two different treatments for the entire sample of 1,974 respondents.  The 
vertical axis displays the investment treatment, while the horizontal axis displays the 
incentive treatment.  The parentheses in each cell depict 95-percent confidence intervals.  
                                                
51 Mutz and Pemantle 2011. 
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Panel A of Table 1 reveals that the impact of incentives is in fact conditional on whether or 
not the project was won.  For states that attracted investment, the difference in the 
likelihood of voting for the governor barely exceeds zero, which is inconsistent with H1.  
For states that lost the project, however, 3.5 percent of voters would shift their vote in favor 
of a governor who offered an investment incentive, raising the average score from 2.76 to 
2.95, lending tentative support for H2.  This result is significant at the 0.05 level and appears 
to indicate that voters, as a whole, are supportive of greater investment, but may not be 
responsive to credit-claiming on the part of elected officials.   Rather, they respond more 
positively to visible effort in a lost cause, offering tentative confirmation of H2.  We find no 
support for H3 in this analysis. 
(Table 1 about Here) 
Testing our theory on the aggregate sample, however, may be too ambitious.  Party 
affiliation is quite strong among American voters and, depending on the state, a significant 
portion of the electorate may not be motivated to alter their vote choice at all, much less 
because of a single incident of attracting investment, as indicated by the thresholds in Figure 
1.   According to our data, about 62 percent of voters self-identify as strong or weak 
members of a particular party—35 percent as Democrats and 27 percent as Republicans.  
Repeated analyses at national and local levels have found party identification to be among 
the strongest determinants of vote choices.52  As every political consultant worth his 
paycheck knows, the battle for election lies in the middle of the distribution among voters 
who are likely to change their mind based on policy choices.  True independents are only 
about 12.5 percent of the electorate, but if we include those who self-identify as independent 
                                                
52 Bartels 2000; Hetherington 2001. 
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but lean toward a particular party (8 percent lean Democrat and 15 percent lean Republican), 
we can carve out a reasonable subsample of 453 observations for our analysis.53   
Panels 2, 3, and 4 analyze the impact of the treatments individually on Democrats, 
Republicans, and independents, respectively.  While all three groups reward the attraction of 
investment (Republicans more weakly than the others), the impact of investment incentives 
is only significant among independent voters.   
Among voters who were asked about their states winning the investment project, 44 
percent of independents whose state offered incentive packages larger than those of 
competing states claimed they were more likely to vote for the governor, as opposed to 39 
percent of independents whose states offered an incentive equal to or smaller than those of 
competing states.  This leads to a 0.13 (3.51-3.38) difference in mean scores on our Likert 
scale, which is just shy of the traditional standard of statistical significance.   
Incentives offered in losing efforts also pay off with independent voters. While such 
efforts have a marginal impact on favorable votes (about 2.2 percent), they do shift 19 
                                                
53 Petrokin 2009 distinguishes between true independents and leaners, who are just as partisan 
and unlikely to be persuaded as those who self-identify as weak members of a particular 
party. Including leaners, therefore, is akin to including partisans.  Unfortunately, there is little 
we can do to resolve this problem. Self-identified independents are a very small group (179 
observations), accounting for fewer than 50 observations per cell.  Randomized treatments 
on such small groups offer insufficient statistical power.  As a second-best alternative, we 
use only independents who registered to vote.  This choice should bias against finding 
differences between independent and partisan voters. 
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percent of the negative voters to the neutral category, significantly increasing the average 
score on the five-point scale by 0.37 (3.09-2.72) points.  Substantively, this is an important 
result which lends further credibility to our experimental treatment.  All voters were told 
how many new jobs had been created and no one was given any negative information about 
the project, yet only independent voters significantly responded to tax incentives.  
 
Ordered Probit Analysis of Experiment 
While the use of a mean score across the Likert scale is an illustrative first cut, it 
assumes that one-point shifts across each level of the scale are equivalent.  This assumption 
may be cavalier, as a shift from a score of 2 (slightly less likely to vote) to 3 (no difference) 
may be very different from a shift from 4 (slightly more likely) to 5 (much more likely).   To 
address this problem, many social science scholars have adopted the use of the ordered 
probit (oprobit) specification for regression analysis,54 which also helps addresses problems of 
heteroskedasticity in multiple regressions and eliminates the possibility that a predicted 
probability for a particular unit on the scale will be larger than one. 
(Table 2 about here) 
Table 2 displays an ordered probit analysis of the two treatments on voter choice.  
Model 1 presents the results for the entire sample.  Both the investment and incentives 
treatments are significant at the 95-percent level. Receiving an investment project increases 
the probability of a vote for governor by 18.2 percent (0.0672 for option 4 and 0.115 percent 
for option 5), while offering an incentive increases the likelihood of a vote for governor by 
3.4 percent (0.0113 for option 4 and 0.0215 for option 5). 
                                                
54 McKelvey and Zavoina 1975. 
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While these results are quite strong, one concern is that responses to the treatment 
may be correlated with characteristics of the respondent, leading to omitted-variable bias.  
By design, randomized survey experiments are meant to sidestep this problem by ensuring 
that voter characteristics are orthogonal to the treatment and we confirm this.55  
Nevertheless, while the treatments are randomly assigned, governors are not.  The 
treatments may therefore have differential effects depending on the interaction between 
voters and the governor.  
To address this problem, Model 2 adds two state-level variables that are critical in the 
electoral performance of incumbent governors: the governor’s state-level approval ratings 
and state unemployment for the previous year. 56 In states with highly unpopular governors, 
the treatment may be too weak to sway vote choices, while the opposite may be true in states 
with very popular governors or excellent economic performance over the past year.  Under 
the latter happy circumstances, how much more certain can a voter be that he or she would 
vote for the incumbent?   The state-level approval rating does prove statistically significant, 
but substantively small.  Each one-percent increase in prior approval ratings increases the 
likelihood of a vote increase by 0.02 percent. The effect of unemployment, however, is not 
statistically different from zero.  Most importantly, our treatment variables are not affected. 
                                                
55 See Online Appendix 1 for balance tests.   
56 The governor approval data comes from SurveyUSA 50 State Tracking of Job Approval 
numbers (http://www.surveyusa.com/50StateTracking.html) for the month of September of 
2009 (when our survey was in the field). We supplemented this with data from 
www.pollster.com for states that did not have September approval data. 
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Nevertheless, the two controls above are insufficient to rule out state-level effects.  
There is a possibility that our results may be driven by unobservable factors among a small 
group of states where changes in voter choice are most likely.  State fixed effects in Model 3 
allow us to address unobserved state-level heterogeneity, ensuring that our results are not an 
artifact of large swings in only a handful of states.  Our results are robust to this change in 
specification (see Model 3), but it is worth noting that the inclusion of state effects increases 
the substantive effect of the investment treatment.57   
Finally, Model 4 controls for a respondent’s current governor-approval rating, which 
is asked in the CCES before our experimental question.  Controlling for pre-treatment 
governor approval does not offer a perfect baseline comparison or diff-in-diff analysis, but it 
does allow us to differentiate a respondent’s change in views about the governor that occurs 
as a result of the experimental treatment from the respondent’s pre-treatment assessment.  
The coefficient on this control variable, which is substantively large and statistically 
significant, indicates that many respondents maintained their opinions of the governor 
despite the new information.  Nevertheless, this additional variable strengthens the marginal 
effects of both the incentives and the FDI attraction treatments. 
The next three panels of Table 2 re-run all four models, but restrict the analysis to 
Independents, Democrats, and Republicans, respectively.  All three groups are positively 
                                                
57 A substantial econometric literature has expressed concerns about fixed effects leading to 
bias in probit and logit estimates. See Abrevaya 1997; Katz 2001; Greene 2004; Coupe 2005.  
This bias, however, is thought to be most pronounced when the number of dummy 
variables is less than twenty.  With 50 states, the bias should be limited. Out of caution, 
however, we interpret the substantive effects from the unadjusted Model 1.   
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affected by the attraction of new investment, but the effect is greater for independents than 
it is for the other two groups.  The impact of investment on Republican voting is less than 
the national average.  When it comes to incentives, there are even starker differences.  Only 
among independent voters does offering incentives greater than those of the competitors 
have a positive impact on voting for the governor.  In Model 5, the marginal effect of 
incentives on the probability of independents voting for a governor is 9.2 percent (4.2 
percent for option 4 and 5.0 percent for option 5).   The impact for Democrats and 
Republicans is not significantly different from zero. 
 
Conditional Effects of Incentives 
 H2 stated that voters will respond favorably to investment incentives in a losing 
effort.  Drawing on the economics literature, voters may be unwilling to pay incentives 
(“provide giveaways” to corporations) for investment they believe their state would have 
won anyway, an insight that underlies H3. Tentative support for this conclusion was found 
in the comparison of means in Table 1.  To test the conditional effect of investment 
incentives more rigorously, we interact the two treatments in Table 3.  Model 1 performs the 
analysis for the full sample, while Model 2 limits the observations to independents.  Models 
3 and 4 demonstrate that the results survive state fixed effects, while Models 5 and 6 add the 
pre-treatment, respondent-level governor-approval rating. 
(Tables 3 & 4 About Here)   
Caution should be taken in interpreting the interaction effects in Table 3, as Norton, 
Wang, and Ai have shown that the calculation of interaction effects in nonlinear models is 
not analogous to that in linear models, and that coefficients and even the sign of effects can 
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therefore not be read directly off regression tables.58 The marginal effects of incentives under 
different conditions are displayed in Table 4. 
Beginning with the baseline treatment in the full sample (no project, no incentive), 
we find that the predicted probability of options 4 and 5 (higher likelihood of voting for the 
governor) is 14.5 percent.  Respondents who were asked about their state winning the 
investment without offering a greater incentive had a predicted probability of voting for the 
governor of 35 percent.  The 20-percent marginal effect of investment attraction without 
incentives is statistically significant at the .05 level.  For states that offered a greater incentive 
but still did not attract investment, the predicted probability of voting for the governor was 
19.6 percent.   Investment lured (or at least believed to have been lured) by greater incentives 
increased the predicted probability of voting for the governor to 42.7 percent.  Thus, the 
marginal effect of investment attraction in the presence of incentives (shifting from Group 3 
to Group 4) is 23.1 percent. 
The marginal effect of investment attraction on voter behavior is not surprising.  Far 
more interesting from our perspective is the marginal effect of greater tax incentives on 
voter behavior, which we depict Table 4.  The results clearly indicate that incentives do less 
to generate votes when the state has successfully attracted the project.  In terms of our 
theory, the blame-avoidance effect (H2) is stronger than the credit-claiming effect (H1).  
                                                
58 Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004. Their prepackaged program for analyzing nonlinear 
interactions, inteff, is only applicable to dichotomous variables, but its intuition has been 
built into Stata’s prvalue, which can be used with the oprobit model.  Using this command, 
we calculate the predicted effects for all four treatment possibilities, which are displayed 
graphically in Online Appendix 2 
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When the project has been won, incentives only provide the incumbent governor 0.032 
percent (0.0009 +0.0023) of the vote among all respondents, which is not significantly 
different from zero.  Incentives offered in a losing effort, however, are far more beneficial, 
providing the governor with a statistically significant vote bonus of 5.15 percent (0.0237 + 
0.0278), consistent with H2.  Among independents, incentives offer even greater 
opportunities for credit-claiming, increasing votes for the governor by 5.65 percent 
(0.0184+0.0381) in a winning effort.  But this is only about half of their impact on votes 
garnered in a losing effort (10.65 percent, 0.0586+0.0479), a statistically significant 
difference. 
 The fact that incentives pay political dividends even in losing efforts is important, 
because it creates a dominant strategy for governors under certain conditions. An incumbent 
worried about reelection prospects can rest assured that he or she will receive a large vote 
bonus from the investment coming to his or her state and a slightly smaller vote bonus just 
for offering the incentive.  If the state loses the project, however, voters will still reward the 
governor for his or her effort; that is, offering the incentive.  Electorally, an incumbent 
cannot lose by offering a tax incentive to a highly visible project.  
Caution is always in order in the interpretation of survey experiments, as modest 
changes in the framing of questions can substantially alter the responses.  Once concern for 
our project is the fact that incentives are tested in isolation; we do not present potential 
trade-offs with other policies that voters may appreciate, such as social spending, 
infrastructure enhancements, education, and tax cuts for individuals.  For the incentives 
question in this paper, we demurred to test the trade-off directly for three reasons.  First, we 
wanted, as much as possible, to avoid priming the respondent in a particular direction.  Of 
course, some voters may already hold an opinion that tax incentives are a form of "corporate 
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welfare" that should instead be spent on citizens.  Our experiment did nothing to dissuade 
them of this opinion and simply captures their response (H3).   As the results reveal, 
Republican voters appear to hold this view.  Secondly, the notion of presenting incentives 
without trade-offs is not artificial.  In fact, this is exactly the way they are presented by 
politicians. Press releases announcing tax incentives rarely say, "Boeing received a five-year 
tax holiday, which will be paid for with cuts in educational spending." To get a clean result 
on how politicians use tax incentives, it was important to frame the issue the way voters 
actually encounter it.   
In this project, we treated all firms as equal, but there is reason to believe that voters 
may respond differently to incentives intended for foreign investors. Consequently, in 
follow-up survey, we conducted an additional robustness test on whether governors receive 
less support by offering tax incentives to foreign firms.59  Our preliminary evidence finds 
that offering incentives to foreign firms dampens support for the governor’s credit-claiming.  
A final empirical consideration is whether it is safe to generalize across states. The 
large amount of variance explained by state fixed effects in these models leads to the 
hypothesis that the impact of politicians’ use of incentives to claim credit may be contingent 
on state-level economic and political factors.  In Model 7 of Table 3, we explore this 
conditional hypothesis by interacting state governor-approval numbers at the time of the 
                                                
59 In a 2010 CCES survey experiment, we varied whether or not the investment was 
“foreign,” “out-of-state,” or “in-state.”  This allows us to compare the effect of foreign firms 
with that of domestic (in-state or out-of-state) firms and to compare the effect of local firms 
with that of mobile (foreign and out-of state) firms. Our experiment was not designed to test 
blame-avoidance and thus all three treatments indicate the state won the investment project. 
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survey with the two treatments.60  The model demonstrates that governor approval 
negatively conditions investment incentives.  In other words, highly popular governors 
benefit less from investment incentives than unpopular governors do.  
Figure 1 charts the interaction effect between incentives and approval.  The y-axis 
plots the marginal effect of incentives on changing one’s vote for governor.  The x-axis plots 
governor approval in 2009.  The solid line charts the predicted change in the probability of 
changing one’s vote in favor of the governor when a greater incentive is offered, while 
dashed lines depict 95-percent confidence intervals.  Panels are separated by whether the 
state won or lost the investment.  The chart shows that whether a state wins or loses the 
project, the vote bonus of offering the incentive declines with popularity.  The positive 
effect of the incentives, however, is statistically significant only for unpopular governors 
(those with lower than 50-percent approval) who make losing efforts.61   
(Figure 1 about Here) 
The result indicates that offering incentives works best as part of a gambling-for-
resurrection strategy, whereby unpopular governors have a higher incentive to engage in an 
economically risky policy that might play well with voters and at least won’t turn voters 
against them.  This finding is speculative, as the interaction was not included in our original 
experimental protocol, but it certainly points to an interesting direction for future research. 
                                                
60 Interactions with state unemployment figures were substantively small and not statistically 
different from zero.  Note that approval numbers are only available for 33 states. 
61 Unfortunately, this same effect cannot be estimated efficiently for independents, as there 
are simply too few observations in each cell generated by the two treatments and the two 
interactions. 
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Conclusion 
 In this paper, we address the political motivations of politicians offering generous 
incentives to attract investment projects despite the uncertainty of the economic benefits of 
such incentives.  Rather than focusing on uninformed politicians or distributional 
considerations, we build on a “pandering” theory, in which politicians provide incentives 
even if they have perfect information that they are ineffective.  They use these incentives to 
take credit for new investment or to deflect blame for hoped-for investment that ends up in 
other states, reaping electoral rewards for an economically inefficient policy. 
 Our work doesn’t falsify the existing theories on how competitive pressures can lead 
governments into a prisoner’s dilemma competition for capital.  But it does show that the 
incentive “wars” can have a positive impact on a politicians reelection prospects.  Offering 
incentives to firms has political benefits to incumbent politicians. 
 We test our theory through the use of a survey experiment with a nationally 
representative sample of Americans.  We find strong evidence that voters, especially 
independents, are more likely to vote for incumbent politicians who use tax incentives to 
attract investment.  Politicians are rewarded more strongly if they offer incentives in a losing 
effort, leading to a dominant strategy under certain economic conditions.  Whether or not a 
state has a chance to win a project, the governor should publicly demonstrate some effort by 
offering an incentive package better than that of other states.  Finally, we show that the 
incentive for governors to offer investment is mediated by their approval ratings.  Popular 
governors have less need to gamble for resurrection by pursuing economically damaging but 
politically advantageous policies.  In addition, we highlight a number of other provocative 
findings on the relationship between tax incentives, voters, and credit-claiming. 
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 Our findings have broader implications concerning the relationship between 
globalization and the nation-state.  While numerous scholars have examined how trade and 
investment can constrain politicians’ behavior, little work has focused on how globalization 
affects political accountability.  We find evidence that the movement of capital can provide 
opportunities for politicians to pander to the public and take credit for new investment 
flowing into their states or districts.  Thus, globalization can make domestic politics more 
rather than less relevant, leading to increased political activity aimed at taking credit or 
avoiding blame for the local outcomes of globalization.  As politicians become more 
constrained in their ability to make policy choices, such as monetary policy, we may see an 
increased incentive for highly visible policies aimed at taking credit for the workings of 
global market forces.   
 39 
References 
ABREVAYA, JASON. 1997.  The Equivalence of Two Estimators of the Fixed-Effects Logit 
Model. Economics Letters 55: 41–43.   
ACEMOGLU, DARON AND JAMES A. ROBINSON. 2001.  Inefficient Redistribution.  American 
Political Science Review 95 (3): 649-661 
AHERN, WILLIAM.  2010. Economic Development Teams in VA, MD, and DC Bid for 
Northrop Grumman Headquarters.  The Tax Foundation. February 15. 
ALDRICH, J. H, J. L. SULLIVAN, AND E. BORGIDA. 1989.  Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: 
Do Presidential Candidates “Waltz Before a Blind Audience?” American Political 
Science Review 83 (1): 123-141. 
ANDERSON, CHRISTOPHER J.  2007.  The End of Economic Voting?  Contingency  
Dilemmas and the Limits of Democratic Accountability.  Annual Review of Political 
Science 10: 271-296. 
ARCENEAUX, KEVIN. 2006. The Federal Face of Voting: Are Elected Officials Held  
Accountable for the Functions Relevant to Their Office? Political Psychology 27: 731–
754. 
BARTELS, L. M., 2000. “Partisanship and Voting Behavior.” American Journal of Political Science 
44 (1): 35–50. 
BARTLETT, DONALD L. AND JAMES B. STEELE.  1998.  Corporate Welfare: Five Ways Out.   
Time Magazine. November 30, 1998. 
BASINGER, SCOTT J., AND MARK HALLERBERG.  2004.  Remodeling the Competition for  
Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom.  American  
Political Science Review 98 (2): 261-276.Pooling 
BASINGER, SCOTT J., AND HAROLD LAVINE.  2005.  Ambivalence, Information, and  
 40 
Electoral Choice.  American Political Science Review 99 (2): 169-184.  
BLOMSTROM, MAGNUS, AND ARI KOKKO.  2003.  The Economics of Foreign Direct  
Investment Incentives.  CEPR Discussion Paper 3775. 
BOBONIS, GUSTAVO J., AND HOWARD J. SHATZ. 2007. Agglomeration, Adjustment, and State 
Policies in the Location of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 89 (1): 30-43. 
BRENNAN, G., AND J. BUCHANAN.  1980.  The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a  
Fiscal Constitution.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
BUETTNER, THIESS, AND MARTIN RUF.  2007.  Tax Incentives and the Location of FDI:  
Evidence from a Panel of German Multinationals.  International Tax and Public Finance 
14 (2): 151-164. 
CANES-WRONE, BRANDICE, MICHAEL C. HERRON, AND KENNETH W. SHOTTS.  2001.   
Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking.  American Journal of 
Political Science 45 (3): 532-550.  
COHEN, JEFFREY E., AND JAMES D. KING. 2004. Relative Unemployment and Gubernatorial  
Popularity. Journal of Politics 66 (November): 1267–1282. 
CONVERSE, PHILIP E. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In Ideology and 
Discontent, edited by David Apter, 206–261 New York: Free Press. 
_______1974. Comment: The Status of Nonattitudes. American Political Science Review 68: 650-
660. 
COUPE, TOM. 2005.  Bias in Conditional and Unconditional Fixed Effects Logit Estimation:  
A Correction. Political Analysis 13: 292-295. 
CUMMINGS, R. G., G. W. HARRISON, AND E. E. RUTSTRÖM. 1995. Homegrown Values and 
Hypothetical Surveys: Is the Dichotomous Choice Approach Incentive-Compatible? 
 41 
American Economic Review 85: 260-266. 
DAVIS, RONALD B. 2004.  Tax Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Potential versus  
Performance.  International Tax and Public Finance 11 (6): 775-802. 
DAWKINS, CEDRIC E. Corporate Welfare, Corporate Citizenship and the Question of 
Accountability.  Business and Society 41 (3): 269-291. 
EASSON, ALEX.  2004.  Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment.  The Hague: Kluwer  
Law International.  
GAINES, BRIAN J.,  JAMES H. KUKLINSKI, AND PAUL J. QUIRK. 2007. The Logic of the 
Survey Experiment Reexamined.  Political Analysis 15: 1–20. 
GREENE, WILLIAM. 2004.  The Behaviour of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator of Limited 
Dependent Variable Models in the Presence of Fixed Effects.  Econometrics Journal 7: 
98–119.  
HARRINGTON, JOSEPH E.  1993.  Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections.   
American Economic Review 83 (1): 27-42. 
HAYS, JUDE C.  2003.  Globalization and Capital Taxation in Consensus and  
Majoritarian Democracies.  World Politics 56: 79-113. 
HELLWIG, TIMOTHY. 2008.  Globalization, Policy Constraints and Vote Choice.  The  
Journal of Politics 70 (4): 1128-1141. 
HELLWIG, TIMOTHY, EVE RINGSMUTH, AND JOHN R. FREEMAN. 2008. The American Public  
and the Room to Maneuver: Responsibility Attributions and Policy Efficacy in an 
Era of Globalization.   International Studies Quarterly 52 (4): 855-880. 
HELLWIG, TIMOTHY, AND DAVID SAMUELS.  2008.  Electoral Accountability and the Variety  
of Democratic Regimes.  British Journal of Political Science 38 (1): 65-90. 
 42 
HETHERINGTON, M. J. 2001.  Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization. 
American Political Science Review 95: 619–631. 
JENSEN, NATHAN M.  2006.  Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political  
Economy of Foreign Direct Investment.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press. 
KATZ, ETHAN. 2001.  Bias in Conditional and Unconditional Fixed Effects Logit 
Estimation. Political Analysis 9: 379–384.   
KONO, DANIEL.  2006.  Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency.   
American Political Science Review 100 (3): 369-384. 
LE, DIEP, ELI MILOSLAVSKY, AND HOWARD J. SHATZ. 2003. State Foreign Office Database,  
electronic database, Public Policy Institute of California. 
LI, QUAN.  2006.  Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax Incentives to Foreign Direct  
Investors: A Cross-National Analysis.  Journal of Politics 68 (2): 62-74. 
LONG, J. SCOTT, AND JEREMY FREESE. 2005. Regression Models for Categorical Outcomes Using 
Stata. Second edition. College Station, TX: Stata Press. 
LUPIA, ARTHUR, AND MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS. 1998.  The Democratic Dilemma: Can  
Citizens Learn What They Need To Know? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
MAGEE, STEPHEN P. WILLIAM A. BROCK AND LESLIE YOUNG 1989. Black Hole Tariffs and  
Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilbrium. Cambrige: Cambridge 
University Press. 
MASKIN, ERIC, AND JEAN TIROLE.  2004.  The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in  
Government.  American Economic Review 94 (4): 1034-1054. 
MCKELVEY, R. D., AND W. ZAVOINA. 1975.  A Statistical Model for the Analysis of Ordinal 
Level Dependent Variables.  Journal of Mathematical Sociology 4: 103–120. 
 43 
MITCHELL, R. C., AND R. T. CARSON. 1989. Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent 
Valuation Method. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
MORISSET, JACQUES, AND NEDA PIRNIA.  1999.   How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect  
Foreign Direct Investment.  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2509. 
MORLEY, HUGH R.  2011.  Panasonic Deal Stirs Criticism of N.J. Tax-Credit Programs.   
NorthJersey.com. March 13. 
MUTZ, DIANA. 2011.  Balance Tests in Survey Experiments.  Working Paper. City: 
University of Pennsylvania. 
NORTON, EDWARD C., HUA WANG, AND CHUNRONG AI. 2004.  Computing Interaction 
Effects and Standard Errors in Logit and Probit Models.  Stata Journal 4 (2): 154-167. 
OATES, WALLACE E.  1972.  Fiscal Federalism.  New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.   
OMAN, CHARLES.  2000.  Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of  
Competition among Governments to Attract FDI.  Paris: OECD. 
PETROCIK, J. R. 2009.  Measuring Party Support: Leaners Are Not Independents.   Electoral 
Studies 28: 562–572. 
POLIMETRIX.  2005. American Public Opinion Poll, October 2005.   
http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl/data.html. Accessed 2011. 
RODRIK, DANI.  1995.  Political Economy of Trade Policy. Handbook of International  
Economics 3: 1457-1494. 
STORY, LOUISE. 2012. “As Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments Pay High Price.” New  
York Times. December 1: A1.  Accompanying incentive database available at < 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/01/us/government-
incentives.html>, accessed on Jan. 11, 2013. 
SWANK, DUANE.  2002.  Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in  
 44 
Developed Welfare States.  New York: Cambridge University Press.  
___. 2006.  Tax Policy in an Era of Internationalization: Explaining the Spread  
of Neoliberalism.  International Organization 60: 847-882.   
SWANK, DUANE, AND SVEN STEINMO.  2002.  The New Political Economy of Taxation in  
Advanced Capitalist Democracies.  American Journal of Political Science 46 (3): 642-655.  
THOMAS, KENNETH P.  1997.  “Corporate Welfare” Campaigns in North America.  New  
Political Economy 2 (1): 117-126.    
THOMAS, KENNETH P.  2011.  Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital. New  
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
THOMAS, KENNETH P., AND FIONA WISHLADE.  2009.  Locational Tournaments in the U.S.  
and the EU.  Working Paper. City: Institution. 
TIEBOUT, CHARLES.  1956.  A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.  Journal of Political  
Economy  64 (5): 416-426. 
WELLS, LOUIS T., NANCY J. ALLEN, JACQUES MORISSET, AND NEDA PIRNIA.  2001.  Using  
Tax Incentives to Compete for Foreign Investment: Are They Worth the Costs?  
FIAS Occasional Paper 15. 
WHITFIELD, DEXTER.  2001. Public Services or Corporate Welfare? Sterling, VA: Pluto Press. 
WILDASIN, DAVID E.  1989.  Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a  
Corrective Subsidy.  Journal of Urban Economics 25 (2): 193-212. 
WILSON, JOHN DOUGLAS.  1986.  A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition.  Journal of  
Urban Economics 19: 296-315. 
___.  1991.  Tax Competition with Interregional Differences in Factor  
Endowments.  Regional Science and Urban Economics  21: 423-451. 
WILSON, JOHN DOUGLAS, AND DAVID E. WILDASIN.  2004.  Capital Tax Competition: Bane  
 45 
or Boon?  Journal of Public Economics 88 (6): 1065-1091. 
WOLFERS, JUSTIN. 2002. Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections.  
Working Paper 1730. City: Stanford Graduate School of Business. 
ZEE, HOWELL H., JANET G. STOTSKY, AND EDUARDO LEY.  2002.  Tax Incentives for  
Business Investment: A Primer for Policy Makers in Developing Countries.  World 
Development 30 (9): 1497-1516. 
ZODROW, GEORGE R., AND PETER MIESZKOWSKI.  1986.  Pigou, Tiebout, Property  
Taxation, and the Underprovision of Public Goods.  Journal of Urban Economics 19 (3):  
356-370. 
 
 46 
Table 1: Likelihood of Vote for Governor (By Party Affiliation) 
 
(Notes. Comparison of mean response to question: … "How would this effect your evaluation of your governor’s performance in office? 
1) Much less likely; 2) Slightly less likely; 3) Vote choice would not be altered; 4) Slightly more likely; 5) Much more likely." 95% 
Confidence Interval shown in parentheses.) 
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Table 2: Ordered Probit Model of Likelihood of Voting for Governor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Incentive> Competitor 0.109** 0.126** 0.127** 0.153*** 0.270*** 0.195* 0.307*** 0.333*** 0.112 0.194* 0.119 0.140 -0.00520 -0.0278 -0.00793 -0.0124
(0.0493) (0.0550) (0.0497) (0.0516) (0.103) (0.117) (0.110) (0.112) (0.0916) (0.103) (0.0948) (0.0984) (0.0985) (0.109) (0.107) (0.110)
Received Investment 0.576*** 0.570*** 0.570*** 0.582*** 0.622*** 0.629*** 0.688*** 0.728*** 0.588*** 0.585*** 0.599*** 0.611*** 0.445*** 0.461*** 0.491*** 0.541***
(0.0516) (0.0575) (0.0520) (0.0545) (0.108) (0.123) (0.113) (0.114) (0.0958) (0.107) (0.102) (0.106) (0.102) (0.114) (0.111) (0.115)
0.00538** 0.000669 0.00539 0.0121***
(0.00219) (0.00410) (0.00433) (0.00463)
0.0121 0.0411 -0.0418 0.0846**
(0.0189) (0.0402) (0.0341) (0.0393)
0.463*** 0.465*** 0.440*** 0.418***
(0.0322) (0.0750) (0.0676) (0.0856)
State Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Cut Point 1 -0.961*** -0.586** -0.830*** 0.216 -1.044*** -0.622 -1.461*** -0.398 -0.960*** -1.105** -0.986*** -0.163 -0.939*** 0.420 -0.592* 0.645
(0.0480) (0.250) (0.172) (0.220) (0.107) (0.504) (0.315) (0.415) (0.0885) (0.466) (0.142) (0.175) (0.0962) (0.525) (0.353) (0.458)
Cut Point 2 -0.641*** -0.286 -0.507*** 0.570*** -0.588*** -0.236 -0.970*** 0.132 -0.645*** -0.793* -0.637*** 0.204 -0.724*** 0.634 -0.354 0.905*
(0.0459) (0.249) (0.173) (0.220) (0.0986) (0.506) (0.317) (0.414) (0.0842) (0.467) (0.136) (0.170) (0.0959) (0.523) (0.359) (0.464)
Cut Point 3 1.010*** 1.375*** 1.175*** 2.375*** 1.005*** 1.390*** 0.761** 1.975*** 1.040*** 0.931** 1.196*** 2.150*** 0.976*** 2.316*** 1.540*** 2.896***
(0.0500) (0.251) (0.174) (0.224) (0.107) (0.514) (0.317) (0.419) (0.0932) (0.470) (0.145) (0.195) (0.103) (0.533) (0.363) (0.477)
Cut Point 4 1.521*** 1.906*** 1.698*** 2.942*** 1.678*** 2.111*** 1.512*** 2.813*** 1.492*** 1.383*** 1.686*** 2.640*** 1.370*** 2.702*** 1.988*** 3.363***
(0.0572) (0.253) (0.175) (0.226) (0.125) (0.526) (0.321) (0.427) (0.106) (0.474) (0.157) (0.206) (0.112) (0.539) (0.369) (0.482)
Observations 1,974 1,595 1,974 1,874 453 356 453 441 580 468 580 552 505 411 505 491
States 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0270 0.0283 0.0389 0.0890 0.0353 0.0347 0.0981 0.145 0.0281 0.0340 0.0844 0.118 0.0161 0.0238 0.0929 0.125
Log Likelhood -2523 -2029 -2523 -2400 -593.2 -459.0 -593.2 -579.0 -732.6 -584.7 -732.6 -692.4 -618.3 -508.8 -618.3 -601.3
Chi-Squared 127.6 107.5 208.5 36.71 28.27 1328 38.23 37.35 . . 19.07 21.67 . .
Marginal Probability of Voting for Governor from Ordered Probit
Sample
(Value Selected) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) (5)
Received Investment 0.0672*** 0.115*** 0.0930*** 0.117*** 0.0608*** 0.122*** 0.0410*** 0.0918***
(0.00744) (0.0105) (0.0194) (0.0209) (0.0125) (0.0203) (0.0112) (0.0207)
Incentive> Competitor 0.0131** 0.0215** 0.0416*** 0.0501** 0.0120 0.0229 -0.000488 -0.00108
(0.00597) (0.00974) (0.0161) (0.0195) (0.00995) (0.0187) (0.00924) (0.0204)
Full Sample Independents Democrats Republicans
Derived rom models 1, 5, 9, and 13. Change in probability of selecting values 4 (More likely) and 5 (Much more likely) from a one-unit change 
in the treatment variables. 
Republicans
Governor Approval 2010 
(State-Level)
State Unemployment 2009-
2010 (State-Level)
Pre-test Governor 
Approval (Individual-Level)
Robust standard errors, clustered at state level, in parentheses. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Dependent variable measured on a five-point scale from (1) Much less likely to (5) Much more likely.  Observations drop in models 2, 6, 
10, and 14  as approval ratings were not available for all states.  Chi-squared test statistic of overall model fit could not be calculated in the presence of state fixed effects in some models.
Dependent Variable: 
Likelihood of Voting for 
Governor in Next Election
Full Sample Independents Democrats
 48 
   
Table 3: Conditional Effects of Experimental Treatments on Vote
Probit 
(Dichotomous)
Full Sample Independents Full Sample Independents Full Sample Independents Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Incentive> Competitor 0.204*** 0.391*** 0.222*** 0.523*** 0.278*** 0.632*** 0.170**
(0.073) (0.102) (0.076) (0.128) (0.081) (0.139) (0.081)
Received Investment 0.673*** 0.740*** 0.668*** 0.906*** 0.711*** 1.031*** 0.156
(0.072) (0.153) (0.076) (0.183) (0.061) (0.173) (0.134)
Incentive*Investment -0.195** -0.244 -0.197** -0.448** -0.258*** -0.616*** -0.082
(0.099) (0.180) (0.099) (0.220) (0.090) (0.230) (0.102)
0.465*** 0.475***
(0.036) (0.063)
Governor Approval 2010 0.002
(State-Level) (0.002)
Incentive*Approval -0.003*
(0.002)
Investment_Approval 0.002
(0.003)
Incentive*Investment*Approval 0.001
(0.002)
Unemployment 2009-2010 0.002
(0.009)
State Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES YES NO
Cut Point 1 -0.916*** -0.990*** -0.774*** -1.370*** 0.289*** -0.270*
(0.057) (0.099) (0.053) (0.087) (0.109) (0.160)
Cut Point 2 -0.596*** -0.531*** -0.450*** -0.872*** 0.644*** 0.272*
(0.048) (0.088) (0.041) (0.085) (0.099) (0.163)
Cut Point 3 1.058*** 1.066*** 1.235*** 0.871*** 2.454*** 2.140***
(0.070) (0.127) (0.066) (0.109) (0.102) (0.199)
Cut Point 4 1.569*** 1.737*** 1.758*** 1.621*** 3.022*** 2.978***
(0.072) (0.145) (0.069) (0.139) (0.110) (0.218)
Observations 1,974 453 1,974 453 1,874 441 1,595
States 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0278 0.0365 0.0396 0.102 0.0903 0.152 0.0538
Log Likelihood -2523 -593.2 -2523 -593.2 -2400 -579.0 176.9
Dependent Variable: Likelihood of 
Voting for Governor in Next 
Election
Ordered Probit (5-Point Scale)
Pre-test Governor Approval 
(Individual-Level)
Robust standard errors, clustered at state level, in parentheses. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  For Models 1-6, the dependent variable is measured on a five-point scale from (1) Much less likely to (5) 
Much more likely.  Model 7 uses a dichotomous variable if the ordinal scale is equal to 4 or 5.  The table depicts marginal effects for model 7. Observations drop in model 7, as  approval ratings were not 
available for all states.  
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Table 4: Marginal Effects of Tax Incentive Greather Than Competing States
(Change in Probability of Voting for Governor in Next Election)
Much less likely -0.001 [-0.0162,   0.0143] Much less likely -0.0115 [-0.0340,   0.0110]
Slightly less likely -0.0006 [-0.0007,  -0.0005] Slightly less likely -0.0122 [-0.0165,  -0.0078]
No change -0.0016 [-0.0017,  -0.0016] No change -0.0328 [-0.0352,  -0.0304]
Slightly more likely 0.0009 [ 0.0008,   0.0010] Slightly more likely 0.0184 [ 0.0136,   0.0232]
Much more likely 0.0023 [-0.0342,   0.0388] Much more likely 0.0381 [-0.0365,   0.1126]
Much less likely -0.0485 [-0.0811,  -0.0159] Much less likely -0.0774 [-0.1364,  -0.0183]
Slightly less likely -0.0153 [-0.0176,  -0.0130] Slightly less likely -0.042 [-0.0537,  -0.0303]
No change 0.0122 [ 0.0083,   0.0161] No change 0.0128 [-0.0025,   0.0282]
Slightly more likely 0.0237 [ 0.0214,   0.0261] Slightly more likely 0.0586 [ 0.0487,   0.0686]
Much more likely 0.0278 [ 0.0088,   0.0468] Much more likely 0.0479 [ 0.0112,   0.0845]
95% confidence intervals in parentheses.  Results derived from Table 3 (Models 1 and 2).
Marginal effects for interactions calculated with STATA's prvalue  function (Long and Freese 2005).  
All Respondents Independents
State Lost Investment Project State Lost Investment Project
State Won Investment Project State Won Investment Project
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Figure 1:  Marginal Effect of Offering Tax Incentive Greater Than Competitors, 
Conditioned by Approval Rating of Governor.  
 
(Notes. Derived from Model 5, Table 4.  Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Marginal effects of triple interaction calculated using Stata’s prvalue function (Long and 
Freese (2005)
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